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Scholars of John Winthrop’s Boston are well familiar with the voyage of the 
Rainbow, which has become one of the staple anecdotes in the history of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony and the early history of New England slavery. The details 
vary with each telling, but a composite version of the story would have the Rainbow 
sailing from Boston to the Cape Verde Islands in 1644 or 1645 under Captain James 
Smith, perhaps in consort with the Blossom under Miles Cawson and the Seaflower, 
commanded by Robert Shapton. In most versions, the Rainbow then leaves the Cape 
Verdes, having shed the other two vessels, and sails to an unspecified location on the 
“Guinea Coast,” where it meets with two unnamed London vessels. There the sailors 
lure several Africans aboard and take them prisoner, after which they go ashore to seize 
more by assaulting a “village.” They are repulsed but in retreat employ a small cannon 
to kill one hundred people. The Rainbow’s captain then sells its prisoners in Barbados 
and returns to Boston in 1645, with only two African remaining on board. 
According to this version, news of the attacks on the African coast soon leaks out 
and a legal case ensues. The Massachusetts General Court charges the Rainbow’s 
captain, James Smith, and mate Thomas Keyser with murder, “man-stealing” (a capital 
offense under the colony’s 1641 Body of Liberties), and “Sabbath-breaking” (since the 
attack apparently occurred on a Sunday). The court does not convict them on these 
charges, however, but does rule that the two Africans whose whereabouts were then 
known, including one who had served as an interpreter, had been enslaved and brought 
to New England illegally. It orders them returned to Africa in 1646, bearing a letter 
expressing “indignation” at the mariners’ conduct. What happened to the rest of the 
Rainbow captives is not known for certain, but most had probably never made it to New 




Historical accounts of the Rainbow’s voyage first began to appear in 
Massachusetts newspapers in 1819, and from their content we can infer that they were 
based on John Winthrop’s “journal.” Copies of Winthrop’s writings (which he never 
called a “journal”) had been circulating among historically-minded Bostonians since the 
late eighteenth century. Noah Webster had published some of Winthrop’s writings in 
1790, but his edition left off before the incident in question, so it was not the source for 
the earliest accounts. However, Winthrop’s papers did continue to circulate amongst the 
members of the Massachusetts Historical Society and probably formed the basis for the 
earliest newspaper accounts. In 1826 a complete edition of Winthrop’s “journal” was 
finally published and from this point most accounts of the Rainbow relied upon it.2 
Although he did not cite it, George Bancroft seems to have relied upon Winthrop for his 
account in the first volume of his History of the United States of America (1842), as did 
other nineteenth-century chroniclers, such as Richard Hildreth.  
Meanwhile, the story continued to appear sporadically in newspapers throughout 
the antebellum period, all recirculating the same basic information. Eventually, in 1866, 
George Moore presented a more scholarly account of the incident, citing the Records of 
the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay, which were published in 1853-
54, along with Winthrop’s journal. Most modern historians, however, know the tale 
mainly from Elizabeth Donnan’s landmark 1935 collection, Documents Illustrative of the 
Slave Trade to America, which reproduced all of the documents known of at the time.3 
For the past eighty years, historians ranging from Lorenzo Greene (1942) to 
Winthrop D. Jordan (1968) to Wendy Warren (2016) have based their interpretations 
almost solely on these materials.4 However, a new cache of documents in the British 
National Archives has emerged that offer a great deal more information, clearing up 
several points of confusion and in some cases contradicting and/or correcting the 
historical record. The materials, from the High Court of Admiralty (HCA), have been 
known to maritime historians for several decades. John Appleby first brought them to 
light in a 1995 article to support the argument that the early English slave trade was 
larger than previously believed. More recently, Richard J. Blakemore has used them to 
explore violence and English commercial ambitions in Africa during the Civil War. 




Bostonian or “American” transatlantic slave vessel. Although the HCA documents 
cannot provide an objectively “true” account of the voyage and tell us very little about 
the Massachusetts side of the story, they furnish a much clearer understanding of 
events in Africa.  
Firstly, the HCA documents offer correctives to the basic chronology and other 
details of the voyage. Secondly and more importantly, they provide specific information 
regarding events on the African coast. Hamstrung by a lack of specific information on 
where the Rainbow actually went in Africa, earlier interpretations were forced to 
generalize about “Africa” and “the Guinea coast.” By providing specific geographic 
information, the new documents allow us to ground the incident in a specific African 
historical context. As it happens, the Rainbow’s crew encountered not a defenseless 
“African village,” but the main port of the militarily powerful West African state of Baol, 
which easily repulsed the sailors’ attack.5 
This, in turn, forces a rethinking of the early New England slave trade. Historians 
have traditionally viewed the Rainbow as the first example of what would become a 
significant economic pursuit for colonial New England. But the Rainbow’s voyage 
actually demonstrates the opposite: early New England slavers were both 
inexperienced and underfinanced. Although not all early voyages ended as badly as the 
Rainbow’s, the very small number of vessels dispatched to Africa in the seventeenth 
century suggests that New England merchants recognized that the transatlantic slave 
trade was challenging and not something they could profitably pursue at that time. As a 
business enterprise, the Rainbow’s voyage was a failure, and a very public one at that. 
It is hardly surprising that it spawned so few immediate imitators. Instead, it would take 
nearly a century for the transatlantic slave trade to become established as a regular 
sector of New England’s economy. 
 
A ”Boston Vessel”? The Rainbow’s British Origins 
The Rainbow, along with its consorts the Blossom and the Seaflower, came to 
the High Court of Admiralty’s attention as a result of a complaint made in 1646 by a 
group of London merchants. The merchants, who were connected with the Guinea 




lawlessness, and foiled attack perpetrated by the crew of these three vessels would 
bring the “Dishonour of our Nation” within Africa and allow the Dutch and the French to 
increase their share of the African trade at England’s expense. The court’s final decision 
is not known, but it did investigate the complaint by taking depositions in London from 
mariners who had served aboard the Blossom and Seaflower. Additional information 
comes from a separate case involving goods damaged aboard the Blossom on its 
passage home to London. However, because the Rainbow returned to Boston and not 
to London, none of its sailors were deposed, which is unfortunate since it means we 
know relatively little about what happened after it parted ways with the other two 
vessels. The High Court of Admiralty documents therefore offer only a partial account of 
the entire Rainbow saga, addressing only those events that occurred on the African 
coast.6 
 Legal depositions, of course, are highly mediated documents that require careful 
handling. People involved in legal proceedings tend to think very instrumentally. Even 
when not lying, they may not tell the whole truth. In this case, Captains Cawson and 
Shapton (although not Smith since he was in Boston) had every reason to deny or 
minimize the scale and scope of any violence perpetrated on the African coast. The 
other seamen who were deposed, however, were not on trial themselves and had no 
direct incentive to lie. They may have been subject to patron-client pressure from the 
defendants, especially if they hoped for future employment. On balance, however, the 
depositions are convincing. For one thing, whatever pressure the seamen may have felt 
to provide testimony favorable to their former captains may well have been offset by 
pressure from the merchants who brought the complaint. There is also a striking 
consistency in the mariners’ statements, from men on different ships and in different 
stations—a part-owner of one vessel, a ships’ carpenter, as well as several seamen. 
 The first point that the documents clarify pertains to the vessels’ origins. In most 
historical accounts all three are presented as New England vessels, making this the first 
“American” transatlantic slaving voyage. The Admiralty Court documents, however, 
establish with near certainty that neither the Blossom nor the Seaflower had any 
connection at all to Boston or any other British colonial port and so should not be 




to Boston is a copy of an original consortship agreement, or an agreement to sail 
together and aid each other, signed by the captains and mates of the three vessels, 
which happens to rest in the Massachusetts Archives (and was reprinted in Elizabeth 
Donnan’s widely used document collection), likely as a result of the Rainbow litigation. 
Nothing in the consortship agreement says or implies that it was signed in Boston, as 
has often been assumed.  
On the other hand, the admiralty court documents describe the Blossom and 
Seaflower with perfect consistency as being “of London.” All of the crew members who 
gave depositions about the 1644-45 voyage were listed as residing in the greater 
London area (two sailors who gave depositions about an earlier voyage by the Rainbow 
were listed as “of New England.”) The Blossom and Seaflower, then, were English 
vessels, plain and simple and almost certainly never even touched at Boston. This 
revelation clears up a related problem in some historical narratives, involving the 
apparent disappearance of the Blossom and Seaflower after the signing of the 
consortship agreement, as well as the sudden appearance of two unnamed London 
vessels. It is now clear that the Blossom and Seaflower were the very same 
“Londoners” mentioned in Winthrop’s diary who took part in the raid on Portudal. This, in 
turn, eliminates the need to have them vanish in the middle of the Atlantic, as they do in 
some retellings.7 
Thus, the Rainbow only barely qualifies as a “Boston” vessel. According to 
depositions from two sailors who shipped aboard the Rainbow on a previous voyage, 
Captain Smith and the Rainbow were based in London as late as 1642. Late that year, 
however, Smith sailed from London with the Rainbow on a complex multilateral voyage, 
touching at the Cape Verde Islands, several locations on the African coast, including 
Portudal on the Petite Côte in Senegambia and up the Gambia River, and from there to 
Barbados and back to Madeira. Deeply in debt, Smith was overheard saying that if he 
returned to London he “should lye in prison all dayes of his life,” so he apparently 
decided while at Barbados to take the Rainbow to New England instead, probably in 
1643. We know that he was in Massachusetts in the following year, because he was 
involved in a minor controversy that came to the General Court’s attention. Smith and 




between a Portuguese vessel and the residents of Hull, Massachusetts, and with the 
blessing of a sympathetic magistrate seized money and goods as a reprisal. However, 
the Portuguese captain complained to the General Court and was awarded 
compensation.  
Smith eventually built a house for himself in Massachusetts and became a 
member of Boston’s First Church. As of 1644, Smith owned a quarter share in the 
Rainbow (whether he always had or whether he purchased the share later is not clear). 
He also seems to have sold or engineered the sale of shares in the vessel to 
Bostonians David Selleck, a soap-boiler, and Isaac Grosse, a brewer. According to one 
of the London deponents, the Rainbow was at that point reputed to be “of Yarmouth,” a 
small town on Cape Cod, though it apparently sailed out of Boston.8 
 
The Rainbow’s Itinerary and Timeline 
 The High Court of Admiralty documents also shed light on the vessels’ itineraries. 
The revelation that the Blossom and Seaflower were never at Boston means, contrary 
to some narratives of the episode, that the consortship agreement was signed 
elsewhere. The deposition of Andreas Bengellye, who served aboard the Blossom, tells 
us the location: all three vessels “Sett Sayle all together from the Maderas and Sayled 
to the Coast of Guinney.” The consortship agreement, then, was surely signed at 
Madeira, a place frequented by ships from both Boston and London. Bengellye’s 
deposition also suggests that the vessels sailed straight from Madeira to the African 
coast, which at first glance might appear to contradict the captains’ agreement to 
rendezvous at “Cape Devird,” but the English used the term to signify both the 
Portuguese archipelago (present-day Cabo Verde) and the point on the African 
mainland after which the islands were named (Cap-Vert, the site of modern Dakar, 
Senegal).9 
The revised itinerary raises further issues regarding the voyage’s timeline. Three 
key dates anchor the story in time: a departure date of 1644 from London for the 
Blossom and Seaflower, mentioned in several of the Admiralty Court documents; a 
departure date from Boston of early November 1644 for the Rainbow, deduced from 




consortship agreement dated February 13, 1644.10  It is the latter date that seems the 
most problematic, since it implies a nine-month gap between the signing of the 
consortship agreement and the departure of the Rainbow from Boston. The confusion 
has led scholars to propose several timelines. Some have suggested that the Rainbow 
actually made two voyages from Boston to Africa, one in 1644 and another in 1645. The 
timing of the supposed first voyage is based on the February 13, 1644 consortship 
agreement; the dating of the supposed second voyage is presumably anchored by 
Winthrop’s journal entry of July 1645. Others have seem to have worked from the 
timeline implied by the arrangement of the documents in Donnan’s collection, starting 
with the signing of the consortship agreement in Boston in February 1644, presuming a 
departure by all three vessels from Boston in November of 1644 (based on Winthrop’s 
journal), with a return to Boston in 1645.11 
The answer is fairly straightforward. By the conventions of the English calendar 
at the time, in which the new year only began officially on March 25, a document dated 
February 1644 would be, by modern dating, February 1645. Later in the seventeenth 
century, the English adopted the dual-dating convention, by which such dates would be 
rendered as February 1644/5, but that convention was not widely used in the 1640s.12 
Thus, Winthrop’s journal suggests (again, it must be said, without complete certainty) 
that the Rainbow sailed for Madeira from Boston in November 1644. Smith, Cawson, 
and Shapton therefore signed the consortship agreement at Madeira in February 1645, 
and the Rainbow (but not the Blossom or Seaflower) returned to Boston via Barbados in 
April 1645. This was a quick but hardly impossible turnaround, especially since the 
slavers did not actually attempt to negotiate a purchase or wait for the delivery of the 
captives, which was the most time-consuming part of most slaving voyages. There was 
therefore only a single voyage from Boston by a single ship, the Rainbow, in 1644-1645. 
 
The George: Miles Cawson’s Failed 1642 Voyage 
Matters of timing aside, the real value of the High Court of Admiralty depositions 
lies in what they reveal about events in Africa. The story that emerges is quite 
complicated. It begins in 1642, when a ship named the George sailed from London to 




As we shall see, the Blossom and Seaflower’s later voyage was a direct outgrowth of 
Cawson’s debacle with the George.  
In 1642 the George anchored off the Petite Côte, a stretch of coastline south of 
modern-day Dakar, Senegal. Cawson sent some trade goods ashore to Portudal, which 
was the principal trading center for the Wolof kingdom of Baol. (One deponent said that 
Cawson first traded at Rufisque, the main port of the Wolof kingdom of Kayor on the 
Petite Côte just north of Baol before landing at Portudal, before moving on to Portudal.) 
Along with most of the other polities in the region, Baol had been involved in Atlantic 
trade since the fifteenth century. Two hundred years of exchange, and slave trading in 
particular, had wrought great change in the region. Baol had once been a province in 
the Jolof confederacy, but the growing Atlantic trade had allowed it, along with several 
other coastal provinces including Kayor, to become independent in the mid-fifteenth 
century. Baol and the other polities in the region all possessed large and powerful 
cavalries, which they maintained by trading captives to the Portuguese for horses. The 
disintegration of Jolof in the second half of the sixteenth century set off cycles of 
violence, all of which fed the slave trade. By the late sixteenth century, the English, 




Map 1: Senegambia and the Petite Côte in the Seventeenth Century
 
Although human beings had comprised a significant portion of the trade of Baol 
and the Petite Côte at large, slaves were just one commodity among several, the others 
being cowhides, gold, beeswax, cloth, and ivory. With no slave-based colonies of their 
own prior to the mid-seventeenth century, English traders in Africa had focused more on 
the non-human goods and commodities. In 1591-92 alone, the English reportedly took 
on at least 18,500 hides on the Petite Côte. With the emergence of Barbados as a 
slave-based colony beginning in the 1640s, English traders were increasingly interested 
in acquiring captives. These were available, of course. Some of those enslaved at Baol 




had come from outside could be traded away. War captives were the most numerous, 
sold to Europeans on the assumption that it was wise to send them as far away as 
possible. Criminals were similarly undesirable, although Atlantic demand undoubtedly 
prompted more questionable convictions than in years past. Lastly, captives who were 
purchased from outside of Baol were also viewed as outsiders with no implied right to 
remain.14 
At Portudal, like virtually everywhere on the African coast, maritime commerce 
was under the control of the local polities, who enforced a set of rules regarding 
customs, residency, and trade practices. For many years there had been a Luso-African 
merchant enclave at Portudal, but by the time the Rainbow arrived it was either in steep 
decline or gone altogether.15 Cawson therefore dealt directly with the Baol state, 
represented by an official administrator known as an Alcaide, whose enslavement to the 
King (or Teeñ) of Baol ensured his loyalty.  
Disputes between Europeans and Africans were a common feature of the slave 
trade. Wariness and mistrust prevailed, and violence was common. Before the arrival of 
the Europeans, Africans had devised a repertoire of practices to handle these disputes, 
and Europeans soon learned to abide by them. Disputes were settled through an 
indigenous process of adjudication known as a “chai” or “palaver,” to which Europeans 
had to submit if they wanted to trade. Violence was integral to this system. Debts might 
be settled by seizing property, including people. Sometimes these actions set off cycles 
of retaliatory violence before they were finally settled. Trade, in other words, always 
carried with it the possibility of violence, and after two centuries of sustained European-
African contact, all parties knew to remain on guard. In this environment, surprise 
attacks like the one rumored to have occurred on the Rainbow’s voyage would have 
been difficult to pull off.16 
Cawson’s 1642 voyage with the George was one of several undertaken by 
independent traders at a time when the Guinea Company, which held a notional 
monopoly on African trade, was in a weak political position. The English Civil War had 
begun, and the Guinea Company’s ties to the Stuart family were a liability.17 Cawson 
took the George to Saloum and to Portudal, where he paid customs to the Alcaide. At 




amount of iron, in a rented warehouse. Things soon went awry. The most likely cause 
was a failure on Cawson’s part to observe regional trading conventions, which were 
intricate and could only be mastered through experience. Customs needed to be paid to 
multiple officials, in the correct assortments and quantities of trade goods, and not just 
for landing the cargo but for procuring wood, water, and food. Various local “captains” 
also needed to be paid, as did the Alcaide every time they met. Whatever the cause, a 
dispute arose and the Alcaide at Portudal allowed Cawson’s warehouse to be plundered 
and his men to be beaten. (One deponent testified that three of his men were killed, but 
Cawson never said so himself). Cawson was forced to abandon his goods and return to 
London.18  
 
The 1645 Attack: Cawson Seeks Revenge 
 The subsequent voyage of the Blossom and Seaflower, which sailed from 
London in 1644-45, was a direct outgrowth of Cawson’s 1642 debacle with the George. 
Cawson, as his men would later testify, wanted recompense for the loss of his goods 
and revenge for the “insolencies committed by the Negroes,” which he undoubtedly 
viewed in racialized terms. Exactly how Cawson persuaded Captains Robert Shapton 
and James Smith to help him is unknown, especially since Smith was based in New 
England and/or Barbados by this time. It is conceivable that Smith simply ran into 
Cawson and Shapton at Madeira and was persuaded to turn a wine-trading voyage into 
a slaving voyage. But since Smith had been in London as recently as 1642, it is also 
possible that he had previous contact with Cawson and/or Shapton and that there was 
prior coordination.  
The plan from the start seems to have been to seize residents of Portudal by 
force. The February 1645 consortship agreement obliges the captains to help each 
other with “what troubles shall accrue” by seizing captives. Their violent intent can also 
be seen in their choice of anchorage. Although most vessels trading on the Petite Côte 
anchored on the leeside of the Cap Vert Peninsula and sent pinnaces down to Portudal, 
the Rainbow, Blossom, and Seaflower went to the shallower, more treacherous 
anchorage off Portudal, thirty miles to the south, the better to launch their attack. Then, 




from each ship, armed with swords, muskets and small artillery pieces. Cawson and 
Shapton later testified that they merely intended to seek redress for the earlier dispute 
but were seized and imprisoned by the Alcaide, which prompted a second attempt to 
land.  Other deponents, however, testified that the foiled attack came first, followed by a 
second landing to “invite” the Alcaide to negotiate aboard ship.19  
As the landing party came ashore, the Alcaide and his captains were waiting for 
them. Cawson and Shapton later said that there were between 4,000 and 5,000 soldiers 
on the beach. This is a probable overstatement—Cawson’s and Shapton’s defense was 
predicated on the notion that the Alcaide attacked them first—but it is not impossible. 
The Teeñ of Baol maintained a personal guard of no less than 200 men and could call 
upon standing regiments of full time soldiers, including cavalry and a corps of elite 
enslaved soldiers known as “ceddos.” The Teeñ of Baol would have been able to 
muster at least a few thousand men, but probably not on such short notice. Still, we can 
be certain that the Teeñ maintained a large contingent to protect his main port, certainly 
enough to fend off a dozen or two men in boats. Cawson’s reappearance with two 
additional ships two years after his initial dispute would have put the Alcaide on his 
guard, perhaps even prompting a request for more troops. The notion that Smith, 
Cawson, and Shapton surprised an unsuspecting African “village” is clearly incorrect. 
This was a well-defended port, with a military garrison that knew to expect conflict.20 
 At this show of force (or, in the telling of Cawson, Shapton and several others, 
after facing several vollies of arrows) the landing party returned to the ships. Later that 
morning, the captains sent a party ashore to invite the Alcaide and others to come 
aboard the ships and talk trade. The Alcaide, his interpreters, and additional personnel, 
came aboard two of the vessels, where they were subdued and imprisoned. The ship 
captains then demanded a ransom for their return, locking most of the delegation in the 
hold but reportedly allowing the Alcaide to stay in one of the cabins. Negotiations 
continued over the next week, and somewhere between sixteen and twenty captives 
were exchanged for less-valued substitutes. This was a common practice in much of 
Africa, especially for elite captives and particularly in Muslim-influenced areas like 
Senegambia. Not all of the hostages were redeemed, however, and the vessels 





Winthrop’s Alleged Massacre: Underestimating the Kingdom of Baol 
 
 Whether Smith, Cawson, and Shapton (or some combination of them) killed one 
hundred residents at Portudal, as reported in Winthrop’s journal, is perhaps the most 
difficult question to answer. Historians, most recently Wendy Warren in New England 
Bound: Slavery and Colonization in Early America (2016), have based their 
interpretation on two sources, an entry in Winthrop’s journal from July 1645, and an 
entry in the diary of Richard Saltonstall from October 1645. Of the two, Winthrop’s is the 
more detailed. He notes that he heard that they had “assaulted one of their Townes and 
killed many people” and that there were “neare 100 slaine by the confession of some of 
the mariners.” However, the fact that this entry was made three months after the 
Rainbow arrived in Boston suggests that it took some time for the allegation of a 
massacre to work its way through the grapevine to Winthrop. Saltonstall does not 
mention how he heard about the attack, but the lack of detail in his account, as well as 
the fact that he wrote six months after the Rainbow’s return, may indicate that his 
information was also based on waterfront hearsay. Finally, the fact that no mention of a 
massacre was made in the aftermath of the trial suggests that the rumors were 
eventually deemed unreliable.22  
None of the Admiralty Court depositions describe anything resembling the 
bombardment mentioned in Winthrop’s journal. Of course, the deponents might have 
kept silent on the question out of an unwillingness to implicate themselves in a mass 
murder. Yet while this explanation makes perfect sense for the accused, Cawson and 
Shapton, it is harder to explain why the other deponents, who were not on trial, would 
fail to mention such a large-scale massacre. Moreover, several of the deponents were 
clearly hostile to Cawson and Shapton and offered damning testimony on other matters. 
Some of the sailors, for example, had been unhappy at the prospect of making an 
assault. John Hacker protested to Cawson that his “designe was not lawfull” and in 
return was called a “coward.” Andreas Bengellye recalled that the crew of the Blossom 




wages if they refused and offered them one-tenth of the proceeds from any sales of 
slaves.  
All of the depositions agree that the landing party was forced to withdraw, and 
none tell of any actual fighting on the part of the sailors. Finally, as documents from a 
separate court proceeding reveal, there was a great deal of dissent aboard the Blossom 
on the homeward voyage from Barbados to London. Poor caulking ruined some of the 
cargo and food, and the crew was given only part rations. Cawson blamed the leaks on 
his carpenter, who was very ill from his time in the tropics, and denied him food and 
water for two days. The resulting “difference and dissent” amongst the crew would 
presumably have removed any inhibition against speaking of a mass murder, but 
nothing was said.23 
It is, of course, possible that an attack occurred later, assuming the Rainbow 
stayed on the coast after Blossom and Seaflower departed. That is, Winthrop’s 
accusation may be interpreted as applying solely to the Rainbow, with Smith landing, 
seizing captives, and killing a large number of people after the other vessels had 
already departed. This could explain the absence of any mention of the killing in the 
London depositions, since any crimes that took place after their departure would not 
have been known or described. This, however, ran counter to the consortship 
agreement, in which the captains agreed to stay together until reaching Barbados. It is 
also worth noting that while Smith and Keyser were charged with murder, the 
Massachusetts court verdict addressed only the dispute over the return voyage of the 
Rainbow and the issue of man-stealing. To be sure, the court may have declined to 
impose a penalty simply because the lives in question were African, but then we would 
have to ask why the court took “man-stealing” seriously enough to mandate the return of 
the African translators (and bear the expense) while failing to punish a murder. 
Perhaps the most compelling reason to question Winthrop’s reference to a 
massacre is that it overestimates the power of the Rainbow’s crew and underestimates 
the ability of an African state to defend itself. In other words, Winthrop’s account is 
questionable not because Smith and company would not have attacked at Portudal 
(after all, they tried) but because they likely could not have prevailed, at least to the 




the depositions, all of which say the landing party was turned away. It also assumes that 
Smith and at most one or two dozen men could have actually pulled off a raid for a 
significant number of captives, killed a large number of people, and made their escape, 
against a well-organized and militarily capable state that would have been on high alert 
for any violence or trickery.  
The story told in the depositions of a landing party repulsed in a hail of arrows, 
with men wounded and the captains barely escaping with their lives, is much more 
plausible and much more easily reconciled with what we know about the Kingdom of 
Baol. Lastly, historians have long pointed to disease as a factor that prevented 
Europeans from wielding significant territorial power in Africa. The depositions do not 
address disease aboard the Rainbow or Seaflower, but they do reveal that the crew of 
the Blossom suffered greatly and that eight or nine of them died. The other crews surely 
suffered similarly, which would have made it even more difficult to mount a successful 
attack.24  
None of this is to suggest that European and American slavers were above 
attacking and killing Africans. It is a matter of record that Europeans did occasionally 
mount raids on the African coast—Nuno Tristão in the fifteenth century and John 
Hawkins in the sixteenth century are the most famous examples. But even with the 
advantage of surprise, both paid a terrible price in the lives of their men (or in Tristão’s 
case, his own life). One Portuguese slaver of the era remarked that “the people of this 
land [near the Senegal River] are not as easy to enslave as we wished,” and eventually 
both the Portuguese and the English concluded that it was more profitable to purchase 
captives than to seize them.25 Abduction, known as “panyarring,” did persist through the 
era of the slave trade. From the perspective of a slave ship captain, it made a certain 
amount of economic sense. But it was almost always done opportunistically, on a small 
scale, mostly because major attacks stood almost no chance of succeeding.26  
Whatever happened at Portudal, the three vessels sailed to Barbados, where 
they sold what captives they had. The depositions from the High Court of Admiralty 
suggest the total number was small, twenty or fewer, consistent with the notion that 
these were the captives given in exchange for the release of the kidnapped Alcaide and 




or raiding. Winthrop indicated in his journal that the Rainbow took on captives at the 
Cape Verde Islands, which suggests an additional stop, but this may reflect Smith’s 
initial cover story, designed to hide his involvement in the Portudal affair, or it may 
simply have been a rumor. Be that as it may, the Blossom and Seaflower returned 
directly to London from Barbados, never calling at Boston. 
 Word of Cawson’s and Shapton’s hostage-taking exploit and foiled attack leaked 
out, causing consternation among London’s African traders. Fearing that the captains’ 
deeds would result in the “destruction of that Trade and Comerse” of the Guinea 
traders, they brought a formal complaint to the High Court of Admiralty. The Rainbow 
remained at Barbados while Smith and first mate Thomas Keyser argued over who had 
control of the vessel. Keyser wound up sailing the Rainbow to Boston, where word of 
the Portudal incident also came out, resulting in the Massachusetts General Court’s 




A Reappraisal: Misconstruing the Slave Trade 
In the final analysis, there can be no doubt that Smith and his confederates 
intended to attack and enslave free men, women, and children at Portudal. The notion 
that Smith and his crew raided and killed at will, however, misconstrues the way the 
slave trade actually functioned. At the heart of the matter is the problematic image of 
Africans as the guileless victims of the European traders, as exotic and savage “others”, 
lacking in states, culture, commerce, military forces, and history. These ideas find 
expression in the geographical imprecision of most historical accounts, which usually 
place the action in an unspecified location on the “Guinea coast.” But as contemporaries 
understood, and as the incident at Portudal clearly shows, nothing could be farther from 
the truth.  
Baol was a powerful state, with military forces, commercial networks, and 
discriminating consumers. And experience—Portudal’s leaders had been dealing with 
Europeans for almost two hundred years when the Rainbow appeared. This experience 




Dutch, and Portuguese (rendered as “Spanish” in the documents). When New 
Englanders arrived on this coast in the mid-1600s, they had little choice but to accept 
the terms laid out by local states and traders. Trickery and violence might gain them a 
few captives, but hardly enough to sustain a profitable trade. The apparent failure of 
Cawson (on both of his voyages), Shapton, and Smith to trade successfully is a good 
illustration of the point—Africans were not naïve nor defenseless. In the seventeenth-
century, procuring captives was both difficult and expensive. 
The Portudal incident has additional implications for our understanding of the 
early colonial slave trade. A number of historical accounts have portrayed the Rainbow 
as a harbinger of things to come.28 No doubt they have in mind not only the 
establishment of slavery in New England, but also the emergence of an American arm 
of the transatlantic slave trade that would ultimately transport over 300,000 Africans to 
New World captivity (mostly to the Caribbean). But that is true only in the longest of 
views. In the near and medium terms, the Rainbow’s voyage did not inspire Bostonians 
to plunge heavily into the transatlantic slave trade. The entirety of New England 
averaged about one transatlantic slaving voyage every four years for the remainder of 
the century. Most Africans in seventeenth-century Massachusetts arrived via the 
intercolonial trade, not aboard transatlantic slave ships. It was only after about 1730, 
when New Englanders solved the problem of trade goods and gained experience in 
Africa, that they were able to embark upon a regularized and profitable transatlantic 
trade in captives.29 
Indeed, merchants in seventeenth-century New England were simply not capable 
of initiating a regular and profitable transatlantic slave trade. The few voyages they 
dispatched tended to be improvised and opportunistic, and would-be slave-traders 
rarely tried a second time. The facts that the Rainbow was only nominally an “American” 
vessel, and that the Blossom and Seaflower were London based vessels, hints at the 
serious challenges faced by early colonial traders. Perhaps the most important obstacle 
was a lack of capital. The English slave trade was dominated by wealthy, occasionally 
even aristocratic investors. The Rainbow’s owners consisted of a ship captain, a soap-




the like—necessitated importing and re-exporting expensive manufactures and taxed 
the resources of most colonial merchants.  
In the final analysis, the fact that Smith had to resort to subterfuge and violence 
to procure captives was a sign of weakness, not strength. It was a direct consequence 
of the inability of the Rainbow’s owners to finance a proper voyage. New Englanders 
also lacked the commercial networks to convey information about precisely which goods 
were in demand. Finally, they lacked experience in African trade, which was likewise 
essential to success. White New Englanders, then, could not simply raid themselves to 
success in the transatlantic slave trade. Profitability required more than just ships and 
armed men.31 
The Portudal incident highlights several truths about African slavery in Puritan 
Massachusetts. As several scholars have suggested, the post-voyage litigation, far from 
indicating a principled opposition to slavery as an institution, actually helped to 
legitimize bondage within the colony. The 1641 Body of Liberties had barred “bond 
slaverie, villinage or Captivitie” but excepted war captives and “such strangers as 
willingly selle themselves or are sold to us.”32 By voiding the enslavement of the two 
men from the Rainbow and returning them to Africa with a written apology, the General 
Court implied that slavery was tolerable as an institution in Massachusetts as long as it 
stayed within the rules. The General Court in effect drew a line between what it viewed 
as legitimate and illegitimate enslavement, with the implication that enslavements done 
in accordance to the strictures of the Body of Liberties would be acceptable.  
The Massachusetts’ chapter of the Rainbow’s story thus remains unchanged by 
the Admiralty Court documents. However, the new findings alter the African chapter of 
the story considerably. Smith, Shapton, and Cawson attacked not a stereotypically 
defenseless, unsuspecting African village, but the chief port of a sophisticated, well-
armed state—and met with predictable results. Ready and willing as they may have 
been to embrace transatlantic slaving, New Englanders would have to look elsewhere 
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